We investigate evolutionary stability of the strategy of defection in the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game played in a quantization scheme that constructs two-player quantum games from a property of quantum mechanical joint probabilities known as non-factorizability. In this scheme the classical PD game corresponds to factorizable joint probabilities and players' strategies in the quantum game remain identical to the ones in the classical game. A recently reported result shows that there cannot exist a non-classical solution for a Nash equilibrium in the quantum PD game constructed according to this quantization scheme. In the present paper we show that surprisingly for the quantum PD game played in this quantization scheme, there exists a non-classical solution for an evolutionarily stable strategy, which is a well known refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept.
Introduction
In the area of quantum games , a result from a recent paper [28] shows that, in the quantization scheme based on performing generalized EPR-Bohm experiments [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] , the twoplayer quantum game of prisoner's dilemma (PD) [44, 45] does not offer a new Nash equilibrium (NE 1 ) [44, 45] , which is different from the classical NE of the game in which both players play the strategy of defection. This quantization scheme constructs quantum PD in two steps:
1) The players' payoff relations are re-expressed in terms of joint probabilities corresponding to a bipartite system shared between two players. In a run each player receives one part of the bipartite system and has two dichotomic observables. A player's strategy in quantum game is a linear combination (with real and normalized coefficients) of his/her two observables. The scheme embeds the classical game within the quantum game by placing such constraints on joint probabilities that for factorizable joint probabilities the classical game emerges.
2) As a set of joint probabilities that violates Bell's inequality must always be non-factorizable, the corresponding quantum game is constructed by retaining the constraints on joint probabilities, obtained in the last step, while joint probabilities are allowed to become non-factorizable.
By constructing quantum games from non-factorizable joint probabilities, which a quantum mechanical apparatus can provide, this quantization scheme avoids state vectors and brings out the essence of quantum games without making reference to quantum mechanics, which has been an important consideration in developing this approach. Game theory finds applications in a range of disciplines [46] and more accessible approaches to quantum games are in need of development.
It turns out that in this quantization scheme the constraints on joint probabilities obtained for the game of PD, which embed the classical game within the quantum game, come out to be so strong that subsequently imposing non-factorizable joint probabilities cannot change the outcome of the game. The quantum game, therefore, generates an outcome identical to the one in the classical game i.e. the case when both players defect. This finding motivates us, in the present paper, to investigate if such joint probabilities are able to bring out some non-classical outcome for a refinement of the NE in the PD game, while not affecting the NE itself.
In this paper we show that surprisingly this indeed is the case, i.e. in the quantization scheme, non-factorizable joint probabilities are able to produce a non-classical outcome in the PD game to a well known refinement on the set of symmetric Nash equilibria-called an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) [47] [48] [49] . This contrasts with the reported result [28] that for the same game, non-factorizable joint probabilities are unable to produce a non-classical outcome for a NE.
Using the quantization schemes of Eisert et al. [5] and Marinatto and Weber [11] , the gametheoretic concept of an ESS was investigated in the area of quantum games by Iqbal and Toor in a series of papers [12, 14, 17, 20, 24] and was reviewed by Iqbal and Cheon in a book chapter [33] . The present paper addresses the questions raised in these publications using the new approach towards constructing quantum games recently proposed by Iqbal and Cheon [28] , which is based on exploiting the non-factorizable property of quantum mechanical joint probabilities.
In our recent paper [36] we investigated a quantum version of matching pennies game played in this quantization scheme to find that non-classical NE emerge in this game for sets of quantum mechanical joint probabilities that maximally violate CHSH form of Bell's inequality [43] . In contrast, the present paper explores the fate of a refinement of the NE concept in the same quantization scheme.
Evolutionarily stable strategy
An ESS is the central solution concept of evolutionary game theory [48, 49] in which genes are considered players in survival games. Players' strategies are the behavioral characteristics, imparted by genes to their host organism and the payoff to a gene is the number of offspring carrying that gene [49] . The players' strategies (which the players genes play until the biological agents carrying those genes die) and their payoffs become related as host organisms having favourable behavioral characteristics are better able to reproduce than others.
An ESS considers a large population of players in which players are matched in random pairwise contests. We call the two players in an interaction to be player 1 and player 2. Each player can play the strategy S or the strategy S ′ in a pair-wise interaction and the payoff matrix for the game is given as
where the two entries in the bracket are player 1's and player 2's strategies, respectively. For example, player 1's payoff is Π 1 (S, S) = a 1 when both players play the strategy S. It is found useful to define
to be player 1's and player 2's payoff matrices, respectively. We write players' payoffs as Π 1,2 (x, y) where subscripts 1 or 2 refer to the players and x and y in bracket are player 1's and player 2's strategies, respectively. An ESS deals with symmetric games in which
saying that, for example, player 1's payoff when s/he plays x and player 2 plays y, is same as the player 2's payoff when s/he plays y and player 1 plays x, where x and y can be either S or S ′ . In words, in a symmetric game a player's payoff is determined by the strategy, and not by the
ESS in Prisoner's Dilemma when joint probabilities are factorizable
To consider game-theoretic solution-concept of an ESS in quantum mechanical regime, we note that quantum mechanics can make only probabilistic predictions and any setup for a quantum game must have a probabilistic description. That is, in a scheme that constructs quantum games from joint probabilities, even the so-called one-shot game must first be translated into suitable probabilistic version before considering quantum version. This translation permits introducing quantum probabilities and then finding if such probabilities can change the outcome of the game. To achieve this in view of the ESS concept, the probabilistic system we consider consists of a bipartite dichotomic physical system described by [28] the following 16 joint probabilities p i with 1 ≤ i ≤ 16:
where π 1 is player 1's outcome, that can have a dichotomic value of +1 or −1, obtained when s/he plays the strategy S or S ′ . We associate S ∼ 1 and S ′ ∼ 2 that then assigns a value for a. Similarly, π 2 is player 2's outcome, that can have a dichotomic value of +1 or −1, obtained when s/he plays the strategy S or S ′ . The same association S ∼ 1 and S ′ ∼ 2 then assigns a value for b. For example, the joint probability corresponding to the situation when player 1's outcome π 1 is +1 when s/he plays S ′ (i.e. a = 2), while player 2's outcome π 2 is −1 when s/he plays S (i.e. b = 1), is obtained from (7) as p 10 .
We now define players' payoff relations when they play the game (1) using this (probabilistic) physical system to which the 16 joint probabilities (7) correspond.
where
Here T indicates transpose and x and y are the probabilities, definable over a large number of runs, with which Alice and Bob choose the strategies S and S ′ , respectively. Joint probabilities are normalized i.e.
A Nash equilibrium strategy pair (x ⋆ , y ⋆ ) is then obtained from the inequalities:
and a symmetric game, defined by the conditions (3), is obtained when
As it is reported in Ref. [28] , in case the joint probabilities are factorizable one can find r, s, r
and the Nash inequalities (11) are reduced to [28] (ŗ −ş)
When joint probabilities are factorizable, the conditions (12) to obtain a symmetric game can be shown to reduce to A = B T and the payoff relations (8) are then simplified to
. Now ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 are evaluated using (16) as
where Ω 1 = a 1 − a 2 − a 3 + a 4 and Ω 2 = a 4 − a 2 . Note that PD is defined by the constraints a 3 > a 1 > a 4 > a 2 and we have Ω 2 > 0, which asks for a natural association of the strategy of defection in PD to the strategy x ⋆ = 0 played in the present setting. When both players play this strategy we obtain from the Eq. (15) Π(0, 0) = Π(S ′ , S ′ ), which is the payoff to each player in the classical game when they both defect. With this association Eqs. (17) give Π(0, 0) − Π(x, 0) = −x∆ 2 and Π(0, x) − Π(x, x) = −x(x∆ 1 + ∆ 2 ), which correspond to the first and second parts of the ESS definition (6), respectively. For this strategy if we take
then two parts of the ESS definition are reduced to
As Ω 1 = Ω 2 − Ω 3 , where Ω 3 = (a 3 − a 1 ), for PD both Ω 2 , Ω 3 > 0. As Ω 2 > 0 and s ′ = Ω 2 /Ω 1 is a probability we require the constraint 1 > Ω 2 /Ω 1 > 0 so Ω 1 > Ω 2 > 0, from which one obtains Ω 2 > Ω 3 i.e.
along with this, of course, that we have a 3 > a 1 > a 4 > a 2 . The extra requirement (21) defines a subset of the games that are put under the name of a generalized PD. For this game the result (20) states that the strategy x ⋆ = 0 is not an ESS, though it is a symmetric NE, when joint probabilities are factorizable, in the sense described by (13) , and have the constraints (19) imposed on them.
Obtaining the quantum game
There can be several different possible routes in obtaining a quantum game. The general idea is to establish correspondence, as a first step, between classical feature of a physical system and a classical game in the sense that classical game results because of those features. In the following step, the classical feature are replaced by quantum feature, while the obtained correspondence in the first step is retained. One then looks at the impact which the quantum feature has on the solution/outcome of the game under consideration. As the mentioned correspondence can be established in several possible ways, there can be many different routes in obtaining a quantum game.
To consider ESS in quantum PD we translate playing of this game in terms of factorizable joint probabilities, which is achieved in the previous Section. We then find constraints on these probabilities ensuring that the classical game remains embedded within the quantum game, which is achieved by Eq. (19) . For factorizable joint probabilities Eqs. (13) apply which allow us to translate the constraints (19) in terms of joint probabilities. In the following step, we allow joint probabilities to become non-factorizable, while they continue to be restricted by the obtained constraints.
The joint probabilities p i become non-factorizable when one cannot find r, s, r ′ , s ′ ∈ [0, 1] such that p i can be expressed in terms of them i.e. as given in (13) . The same payoff relations (8) , therefore, correspond to the qunatum game, whose parts are given by (9) , and players' strategies remain exactly the same.
We require that the constraints (19) , when they are re-expressed using (13) in terms of joint probabilities p i , remain valid while p i are allowed to be non-factorizable. We notice that Eqs. (13) allow re-expressing the constraints (19) in terms of p i as
and the constraints (19) take the form
At this stage we refer to the analysis of joint probabilities in generalized EPR-Bohm experiments by Cereceda [50] reporting that eight out of sixteen joint probabilities can be eliminated using the normalization constraints (10) 
The constraints (10, 24) , of course, do hold for factorizable joint probabilities that are given by Eqs. (13) 
and the payoff relations (8) now involve only eight 'independent' probabilities.
ESS in quantum Prisoner's Dilemma
For the strategy of defection (x ⋆ = 0) in the quantum game with payoff relations (8) , the ESS definition (6) and Eqs. (17) give
which is equated to zero so that the strategy x ⋆ = 0 remains a symmetric NE in the quantum game, as it is the case in the game when joint probabilities are factorizable, and which is described by Eqs. (20) . With setting Π(S ′ , S ′ ) = Π(S, S ′ ) the second part of the ESS definition (6), which is evaluated in (17) , reduces itself to
With Cereceda's analysis and using Eqs. (25) , setting Π(S, 
and under the constraints (28) the strategy x ⋆ = 0 then remains a symmetric NE even for nonfactorizable joint probabilities. Also, using Eqs. (25) the constraints (23) can be re-expressed in term of 'independent probabilities' as
which allows us to arbitrarily eliminate probabilities p 1 and p 12 from the constraints (28) to re-express them as
Using Eqs. (25), while considering the strategy x ⋆ = 0 for the second part of the ESS definition the Eq. (27) becomes
which simplifies further when we eliminate p 1 and p 12 using (29) and afterwards eliminate p 14 and p 15 using (28) to obtain
As Ω 1 > 0, the strategy x ⋆ = 0 thus becomes an ESS if
and when joint probabilities p i satisfy constraints (29, 28) , along with the constraints given by normalization and causal communication.
Discussion
We have investigated the game-theoretic solution concept of an ESS within a quantization scheme that constructs quantum games from the non-factorizable property of quantum mechanical joint probabilities. Neither entanglement nor violation of Bell's inequality [41, 43] is used explicitly in this construction in the following sense. As a set of joint probabilities that violates Bell's inequality must be non-factorizable, a non-classical solution of a game, which is played in this scheme, can emerge even when there is no entanglement and the quantum state under consideration is separable. This is understandable as a direct link between violation of Bell's inequality and separability of a quantum state is established only for pure states via Gisin's theorem [51] and a separable mixed state may still violate a Bell's inequality, which will correspond to a set of non-factorizable joint probabilities. This is also consistent with reported results [52] showing, for example, that a quantum game can have a solution in the so-called "pseudo-classical domain", in which Bell's inequality is not violated. These domains exist between fully classical and fully quantum domains-where Bell's inequality is violated.
Eq. (32) shows that probabilities p 4 , p 5 , p 8 , p 9 can be taken to be 'independent' as, out of the remaining four probabilities, the probabilities p 14 and p 15 are obtained from (30) and probabilities p 1 and p 12 are obtained from (29) . The remaining eight probabilities p 2 , p 3 , p 6 , p 7 , p 10 , p 11 , p 13 , p 16 are then obtained from (25) . The scheme used to obtain a quantum game assumes that a set of non-factorizable joint probabilities, which satisfy normalization (10) and causal communication constraint (24) , can always be generated by some bipartite quantum state (pure or mixed) provided that the set does not violate CHSH form of Bell's inequality beyond Cirel'son's limit [53] .
A natural question here is to ask if Bell's inequality is violated by requiring p 8 + p 9 > p 4 + p 5 , which makes the strategy of defection (x ⋆ = 0) an ESS. To answer this we consider probabilistic form [50] of CHSH version of Bell's inequality [43] expressed as −2 ≤ ∆ ≤ 2 where ∆ = 2(p 1 + p 4 + p 5 + p 8 + p 9 + p 12 + p 14 + p 15 − 2). We insert values for p 1 , p 12 , p 14 , p 15 using (29, 30) to obtain ∆ = 2(2p 4 + p 9 − 1).
Now, comparing (34) to (33) shows that the violation of the CHSH inequality is not essential for the strategy of defection to be an ESS for a set of non-factorizable probabilities, when for a factorizable set of probabilities this strategy is non-ESS and a symmetric NE only.
To summarize, a non-classical solution for an ESS in the quantum PD game has been shown to emerge due to quantum mechanical joint probabilities that are non-factorizable. An ESS offers a stronger solution concept than a NE and we consider the situation in which the same NE, consisting of the strategy of defection on behalf of both players, continues to exist in both the classical and the quantum versions of the PD game, which correspond to situations of joint probabilities being factorizable and non-factorizable, respectively. It is shown that non-factorizable quantum joint probabilities can bring evolutionary stability to the strategy of defection via the 2nd part of the ESS definition (6) .
